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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No. 20489
vs.
TRI-O, INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Can an express warranty arise when a contractor

supplies equipment for use by a subcontractor, even though no
warranty was intended?
2.

Can performance of a pre-existing contractual obliga-

tion in reliance on a factual representation constitute consideration for an express warranty not tied to the sale or leasing
of goods?
3.

Did the district court err in refusing to find as a

matter of law that the rope used was adequate for the anticipated wire flying operation and that the alleged breach of
warranty did not cause either the crash or the alleged injury?

4.

Did the court's instructions to the jury erroneously

inform the jury that express warranties are absolute and are
subject to no limitations or objective standards?
5.

Did the district court err in admitting into evidence

a chart, which was first offered the day after both parties had
rested, summarizing an economist's direct testimony without
allowance for concessions made on cross-examination?
6.

Did the district court err in refusing to grant defen-

dant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence and
fraud on the court?
7.

Did the district court err in awarding prejudgment

interest when the jury resolved the case on a general verdict
which did not distinguish between special and general damages?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
There are no authorities which appellant believes to be
directly dispositive of any of the issues in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries
and property damage arising out of a helicopter crash on
May 24, 1977.
Course of Proceedings Below
This case was first tried in January, 1981.

Before that

trial, the trial court resolved plaintiffs' claims of res ipsa
-2-

loquitur and strict liability against them.

(R. 143.)

Plain-

tiffs* claims for breach of express and implied warranty were
dismissed at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence (R. 223),
and the issue of negligence was submitted to the jury.
jury found that neither party had been negligent.

The

(R. 229.)

On plaintiffs' appeal following the first trial, this court
ruled that the issue of express warranty should have been
submitted to the jury, and remanded the case for retrial of
that issue and the issue of damages.

Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667

P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) .
The express warranty claim was tried to a jury on
October 30 through November 9, 1984.

The jury found in favor

of plaintiffs, awarding damages to plaintiff Groen of $975,000
and to plaintiff Rocky Mountain of $37,500 (R. 1602.) The
district court entered judgment on the general verdict on
November 30, 1984.

(R. 1599-1601.)

On December 3, 1984, the

district court by memorandum decision denied defendant's Alternative Motions for Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict and New Trial.

(R. 1603-10.)

effect was entered on January 9, 1985.

The order to that

(R. 1625-26).

dant filed its Notice of Appeal on February 4, 1985.

Defen(R.

1629A.)
Statement of Facts
In May 1977, defendant Tri-O, actually a subcontractor but,
for simplicity, referred to herein as contractor, was stringing
-3-

power lines near Wellington, Colorado.

It subcontracted with

Rocky Mountain Helicopters ("Rocky Mountain") to provide a
helicopter and pilot to string the lines in an operation called
"flying wire."

(Tr. 714.)

The process of flying wire requires

a helicopter to pull a "sock line" consisting of a lead rope
approximately 100 feet long attached to a much longer 3/8 inch
cable, along the electrical towers.

The helicopter pilot lays

the line into "fly travelers" which hang from the tower arms
and which close around the line after insertion.
On May 24, 1977, Groen was flying Rocky Mountain's helicopter pulling the sock line.

While Groen was stringing the

line, the line snagged on a tower arm, causing the lead rope to
break and become entangled in the helicopter's controls.
Although the rotors continued to turn, preventing a free-fall,
Groen lost control and the helicopter crashed.

Groen alleges

that, although he continued to work as a pilot until July,
1982, more than four years after the accident, (Tr. 625), the
impact caused him back injuries which have resulted in severe
headaches and an inability to hold gainful employment.
On retrial, plaintiffs1 sole theory for recovery was that
Tri-O, through a supervisor at the job site, expressly warranted the adequacy of the rope for the wire flying operation.
Tri-0 denied that any warranty was made, contended that Groen's
speed and method of flying were not and could not have been
contemplated and that the speed and method of flying were the
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the second trial, Groen contended that he requested 3/4 inch
Samson rope.

(Tr. 81-86.)

This distinction is important

because it was established at the first trial and uncontested
at the second trial that 1/2 inch Samson rope would also have
broken under the alleged facts.

(Tr. 1112.)

Plaintiffs contended that two express warranties were
made.

First, they contended that Tri-O's superintendent, Ken

Clinger, represented that the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope was
as strong as 3/4 inch Samson rope.

The evidence at trial was

uncontroverted and defendant readily admits that the 1/2 inch
Columbia PD-10 polypropylene rope is not as strong as 3/4 inch
Samson rope.

It was further uncontroverted that 3/4 inch

Samson rope would not have broken in this case.

(Tr. 1115-17.)

Second, plaintiffs contended that Tri-0 through Clinger
warranted the rope to be adequate for the wire flying operation.

Tri-0 contended that even though no warranty was

intended or made, the rope was in fact adequate for the job and
that, if such a warranty was made, it was limited by an assumption that Groen would fly the wire in the manner customary
among other experienced pilots.

Mr. Clinger, however, denied

representing that the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope was as strong
as 3/4 inch Samson.

(Tr. 751.)

Groen grossly varied from usual flying technique in two
ways, neither of which was anticipated when the alleged warranty was made:

his excessive speed and the manner in which he
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ho

The second aspect of Groen's flying technique which
deviated from the norm was his practice of laying the lead rope
against the insulators from which the fly arm was suspended,
rather than into the fly arm itself.

(Tr. 1010-11.)

Using

this method, he would sometimes miss the traveler and land the
rope on the tower arm itself.

On the tower prior to the snag,

Groen had laid the rope on the arm.

(Tr. 101.)

The evidence

was that other pilots avoid laying the rope on the arm, and if
they happen to do so, they stop and carefully lift the rope
because of the probability of a snag.

(Tr. 870-71, 910-11,

1013.)
The accident was caused when the lead rope which Groen was
pulling snagged while Groen dragged it across the tower arm.
(Tr. 101.)

Groen admitted that he was going too fast to stop.

(Tr. 728.)

The rope stretched, broke and whipped back into the

helicopter controls, which caused Groen to lose control and
crash.

(Tr. 101-02.)

The blades continued to spin, however,

which prevemted the craft from free-falling to the ground.
(Tr. 101-03, 1125-27.)

Defendant asserts that Groen's misuse

of the rope, rather than its inadequacy or failure to meet a
warranted standard, caused the accident, and that Groen's use
was outside the scope of the warranty, in that Groen's excessive speed and his unorthodox method of flying were not
reasonably foreseen or anticipated by Tri-0 at the time the
alleged warranty was made.
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A.

The law of warranty has historically been con-

fined to commercial transactions analogous to a sale of goods.
Until this court's prior decision in this case, it had never
been extended to cover equipment supplied by a contractor to a
subcontractor for use in performing contracted work.
B.

Extension of the law of warranty beyond the sale

of goods analogy imposes strict liability for innocent misrepresentations.

The action is based partially on deceit and

partially on breach of contract.

Unlike the plaintiff in a

deceit action, however, the plaintiff in this action was not
required to prove fault.

Further, unlike the plaintiff in a

breach of contract action, the plaintiff in this action was not
required to prove that the defendant intended to make a warranty.

In essence, any statement alleged to have been made by

a supervisor on a job site relating to working conditions or
equipment becomes a warranty if relied upon.
C.

If a new cause of action for breach of express

warranty outside the sale of goods analogy is to be created, it
should be created only by the legislature.

Judicial creation

of such a cause of action is inappropriate because the court is
not equipped to adjust and accommodate the conflicting interests involved and is not equipped to immediately define the
elements of the cause of action and the defenses thereto.
D.

A new cause of action for breach of an express

work place warranty should be created prospectively only,

-10-

because defendant and oUiui n IIIN lelendant '
" !„. pob J IL n mi Ihd n'n
entered into business relationships in justifiable reliance on
the prior stale of the In*

Kptroactr n=» creation oi the C H use

oi, action exposes defendant, 1; u a liability in excess of
$1,000,000 based on a risk which it did not agree to assume and
from

wl'i i 1 "lll'i 1 I

I I

" 11 I 1 I In 1 'i» | n o f e e l er'1 111 s e I I l i y n e c | o t " 11 riii 1 in

Tin1 a LI eg ed e x p r e s s warranty 111 t i n s cvjse is unen-

f o r c e a b l e because it; i s not s u p p o r t e d by c o n s i d e r at ion
0 r o e 11'" i. iii |r eeiiK "in 1 h i

I hi

w11 n rant y is insufficient

in 11 I 1 1111 1 m 111111111 1 In

ill hi |fhl e x p r e s s

in act as a substitute for considera-

tion 111 this case.
i'ii

I I mi mi II ni i n 1 ni . | K ; » i 111 ni il I 1 1 I I

s i d e r a t i o n in t h i s c a s e

11L1L1II 1 1 1 ill: e il t n

11" n

line coin t w i l l have indeed c r e a t e d

s t r i c t n i h i l i t y for m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,
element oi the warranl \ ii ..i ll

because r e l i a n c e us an

Wherever » varr^rii-v e x i s t s ,

1 ui" l i a n c e e x i s t s as a matter of law in HI hi

il

in in | i i 1 ni v .

B

CropTi'F r e l i a n c e

in l hi

i n s t a n t c a s e was simply

performance of a p r e - e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t u a l d u t y , and iiiulei
qeniPiir'iri 1 en nnil 1 1 I

111,

[Hi 1111

n u n ill

n i l 1 I 1 II n l 1

ll 1 n

*ccidenl

11111 b u n e

11 II 1 'i I II11 ni u n i p e t e n !

I nil I

1 di

I I ' unity b f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e a l l e g e d b l e a c h oi

hi ni mini t y was t h e cause of **•

mi

1 1 iiiii

II IIIII

mi 111 1 ii 1 1 II

IIIII

"in 1""

- 1 I --

and t h a t Groen d i d not:
iin I 11111,

1 I 1 I 11 •

-

A.

Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that their

injuries were caused by the alleged breach of warranty.
Defendant's expert witness testified that if the rope had not
broken, the same accident or a worse accident would have
occurred due to structural failure of the helicopter.
B.

The only evidence offered by plaintiffs on the

issue of causation was the opinion of Gary Flandro, which was
without foundation and was inadmissible.

Flandro testified

that the helicopter structure might have failed in a different
place than the place identified by defendant's expert.

His

testimony, however, was based solely on examination of photographs on the witness stand, and he admitted that he lacked any
personal knowledge of the facts on which he testified.
C.

An express warranty must be limited in scope to

that obligation which the warrantor agreed to assume, and is
premised on the theory that the plaintiff will use the product
within the scope of the warranty.

Groen's method of flying was

grossly unorthodox and was not contemplated or disclosed at the
time the warranty was made.

The warranty must be assumed to

extend only to reasonable methods of flying, and not to Groen's
unorthodox methods.
IV.

The jury instructions in this case were unduly

slanted in favor of the plaintiff in that they created the
erroneous impression that warranties are absolute and without
limitation.
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VI.

The lower court erroneously admitted into evidence a

summary of an economist's testimony which was not offered until
after both sides had rested and which failed to reflect in any
manner concessions the witness made on cross-examination.
VII.

The jury's award of damages was clearly excessive in

light of the evidence.
damages of $212,000.

At the first trial, the jury found

At the second trial, the jury found

damages of $975,000 based on the same evidence and based on
evidence which dictated a lower, rather than higher, award.
VIII.

The jury resolved the case on a general verdict which

did not distinguish between special and general damages.

The

district court committed error in presuming that the jury would
have awarded Groen all of the special damages which he claimed
and in then awarding prejudgment interest thereon.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT SUPPORT APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXPRESS WARRANTY.
At the first trial of this case in 1981, the trial judge
ruled that the case sounded in tort, not contract, and that the
facts as alleged neither supported nor fit within the doctrines
of express or implied warranty.

On appeal, this court reversed

and remanded the case for retrial, ruling that the doctrine of
express warranty was applicable.
598 (Utah 1983).

Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d

A record has now been developed in the lower
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The court, however, summarily held that an express warranty
of fitness could arise outside the commercial sale or lease of
goods, and analyzed this case in terms of the existence of a
factual dispute.

Id.

at 606.

The holding that an express

warranty can arise at a job site when a contractor supplies
equipment for use by a subcontractor creates a fundamental
change in the allocation of job site risks and should be
re-examined.

Except for this court's prior decision in this

case, there is no case which has extended the law of express
warranty beyond the sale (or lease) of goods and into the realm
of the workplace.
A.

The Court's Ruling in This Case Has Created Strict
Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation.

Extension of the law of warranty as this court has done
creates a new cause of action falling between breach of contract and deceit.

It is, in essence, an action for misrepre-

sentation without fault.

It is composed of some, but not all,

of the elements of negligence and contract, but takes from each
in a way that requires the plaintiff to assert nothing more
than reliance on an untrue affirmation of fact.
Courts have uniformly and consistently refused as a matter
of public policy to extend the tort of misrepresentation to
encompass innocent misrepresentations because the defendant in
such circumstances is exposed to draconian liability without
intent, fault or an understanding that it is doing so, and
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without having breached a contract, just as the defendant in
this case has done.

See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law

of Torts 748-49 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter "Prosser &
Keeton").

Unlike the plaintiff in an action for negligent

misrepresentation, the plaintiff in this newly created cause of
action does not have to prove negligence or other fault on the
part of the defendant.

See Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373

P.2d 382, 384-85 (1962).
Neither is the plaintiff in this new cause of action
required to assert or prove the usual elements of a claim based
on contract.

See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d

427, 428 (1961); E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137
P.2d 342, 346 (1943).

This court's earlier ruling in this case

means that a warranty can exist despite the fact that no warranty was actually or reasonably intended.

667 P.2d at 606.

In the context of a sale of goods, the elimination of the
intent to make a warranty is justified on the grounds that the
warranty is considered a part of the bargained-for consideration and there is thus an objective manifestation of an intention to be bound.

Prosser & Keeton at 748. When a selling

party makes an affirmation of fact, it is presumed that he
intended such affirmation to induce the other contracting party
to enter the sale agreement.
The asserted warranty in this case, however, is different.
Unlike the usual warranty, which is tied to an exchange of
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goods or other property and is part of the inducement for the
exchange, this warranty, if it exists, exists independent of
any other exchange, because the original contract had already
been consummated.

Thus, its only elements are a misrepresenta-

tion of fact and reliance thereon.

In effect, the court has

done indirectly that which courts have unanimously refused to
do directly: impose strict liability for any representation of
fact which turns out to be untrue.
B.

The Creation of a Cause of Action for Warranty Outside
the Sale or Leasing of Goods Should Be Left to the
Legislature.

This court has ruled in this case that an employee of a
subcontractor on a job may sue the contractor for breach of a
warranty made by a supervisor at the worksite, even though
neither the supervisor nor the contractor intended a warranty
and even though both acted without fault.
the law.

Such has not been

If it is to become the law, the choice is for the

legislature, not the court, not only because the choice involves an adjustment and accommodation of conflicting interests
which this court is ill-equipped to make, see Bastian v. King,
661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983), but also because the legislature
can define in the enactment both the elements of the cause of
action and the defenses thereto.
These considerations are particularly important in the case
at bar.

Defendant has been charged with making an oral express
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warranty that a rope was strong enough for use in flying wire.
According to the court's instructions, the jury was told that
any limitation to such warranty also had to be expressed, and
that if none was expressed, the warranty was unlimited.
(Instruction No. 13, R. 1544.)
The Uniform Commercial Code, which the lower court used as
a guide in defining the elements of warranty, provides the
broad definitions of warranties used in this case, Utah Code
Ann. S 70A-2-313 (1980), but also provides protections to
ensure that a warranty is not unjustly found or applied.

The

warranty upon which plaintiffs rely in this case, however, was
not made in connection with the sale of goods, and the
statutory provisions are thus inapplicable,

^d. § 70A-2-102.

Because this court's language in its prior decision defining
the elements of the warranty was parallel to the broad language
of the U.C.C., plaintiff's burden of proving consideration for
and intention to make the warranty was substantially relaxed or
eliminated, but defendant was not given the benefit of the
statutory defenses and limitations which are the quid pro quo
for the broad U.C.C. definition of warranty.

Tri-0 was not

given the opportunity to disclaim the warranty or its liability
for consequential damages, id. §§ 70A-2-316, -719 (1980), and
was not given the opportunity to claim the benefit of the
statute of frauds, id. S 70A-2-201.
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The facts of this case demonstrate the injustice of the
doctrine which the court has created.

The first discussions

between Tri-0 and Groen regarding the rope occurred after Groen
arrived at the job in Colorado on May 22, 1977.

(Tr. 737.)

The contract or agreement between Rocky Mountain and Tri-0 was
consummated between May 17 and 20, 1977.

(Ex. D-18.)

There is

absolutely no claim or evidence that the rope was even discussed by Rocky Mountain and Tri-0 at the time of contracting,
much less that any representations regarding the rope were part
of the bargain when the agreement was reached.
737-39.)

(Tr. 598-600,

The only reasonable inferences are that Tri-0 did not

intend to warrant the rope used and that Rocky Mountain did not
bargain for such a warranty.
The only defense which Tri-0 was permitted to assert was
that Groen used the rope outside the scope of the alleged
warranty.

That defense, however, was ineffectual, both because

of the court's instruction that the scope of the warranty is
unlimited unless limitations are explicitly stated (Instruction
No. 13, R. 1544), and because of Groen1s apparent willingness
to change his testimony to meet the particular theory of his
case.

The dangers of creating a cause of action without care-

fully considered safeguards against abuse are demonstrated in
this case.

At the first trial, Groen testified that the

alleged warranty was that the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope was
H

as strong as" Samson rope.

There was no actual mention of
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size, but his exemplar rope was 1/2 inch and the reasonable
inference was that the comparison was of the same diameter.
The evidence at the first trial, even through his own expert,
was uncontroverted that 1/2 inch Samson and 1/2 inch polypropylene ropes would break at the same speed, under 30 miles
per hour.

(Tr. of first trial 606, 613.)

At the second trial, Groen modified his version of the
facts, claiming that he asked not just for Samson rope, but
that he asked for 3/4 inch Samson rope, because it was the only
rope he had ever used.

(Tr. 81-86.)

Concededly, 1/2 inch

polypropylene rope is not as strong as 3/4 inch Samson rope.
The evidence, however, showed that Groen had never used Samson
rope on prior jobs.
job he had flown.

Groen identified each prior wire pulling

There were three:

a Commonwealth Electric

job in Idaho, a Commonwealth Electric job in Colorado and a San
Miguel Power Company job near Montrose, Colorado.
179.)

(Tr. 178,

Groen testified that he used Samson rope on each.

(Tr.

188, 204, 207.)
Larry Wehrli was the superintendent on the Idaho
Commonwealth job.

He was present for the entire job and

watched Groen pull wire.
wire on that job.

Samson rope was never used to pull

Groen used the exact type of rope introduced

at trial as the rope used in the Tri-0 job.

(Tr. 356-363.)

Wehrli was a friend of Groen's (R. 180) and Groen had even
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asked him before the first trial what type of rope was used on
the Idaho Commonwealth job.

(Tr. 363-366.)

John David was a lineman who worked with Groen on the
Colorado Commonwealth job.

In fact, Mr. David sat in the

towers and passed the rope through the travelers as Groen
pulled it in by helicopter.

(This was a hand pass operation

and fly travelers were not used.)

Again, polypropylene rope,

like that used in the Tri-0 job, was used by Groen on this
Commonwealth job.

(Tr. 893, 898-899.)

Finally, Frank Graybeal, an employee of San Miguel Power
Company, testified he was present and observed Groen for the
entire job near Montrose, Colorado.
different.

The poles were wood.

That job was totally

No travelers were used.

line was simply laid on top of the wood cross arms.
rope was used on the job.
this job.

The

No Samson

In fact, no lead rope was used on

(Tr. 670-674.)

Because there was no requirement of a writing and no opportunity to disclaim the warranty, and because the jury was
instructed that the warranty was unrestricted when no restrictions were explicitly stated, Tri-0 was in effect without a
defense to Groen's claim.
The injustice was aggravated by Groen's failure, at the
time the alleged warranty was made, to disclose that his method
of flying involved laying the rope on the tower arm, which
makes snags more likely, and that he intended to fly almost

-22-

three times faster than other pilots performing the same operation.

Because the action was not a negligence action, defen-

dant could not assert the defenses of contributory fault and
assumption of risk.

Because the action was not a contract

action, the plaintiff was not required to prove offer, acceptance or mutual assent, and defendant was not allowed to defend
on the basis of lack of intent to make a contract or mistake.
Moreover, consideration was presumed to exist by virtue of
reliance on the alleged warranty, even though such reliance was
also an element of the warranty claim itself.
below.)

(See Point II

The upshot is that the court has created a new cause

of action without providing necessary safeguards and without
guidance as to the defenses which might be available, and
defendant herein has been caught in the transition.
Finally, sound policy reasons dictate that express warranties outside the sale of goods analogy should not exist, especially in the environment of the workplace.

Without a require-

ment of a writing, and without a requirement of independent
consideration to ensure that the party charged with making a
warranty understands the nature of the undertaking, any statement alleged to have been made by a supervisor on a job site
relating to working conditions or equipment becomes a warranty
if relied upon.

As this case demonstrates, there is no

limitation on the scope of liability which the employer may
incur, and no way of adequately protecting the employer from

-23-

exaggerated or false claims.

In essence, the court has imposed

strict liability for misrepresentation, requiring neither
intentional nor negligent conduct, and without the usual elements of a breach of contract action.

Such liability has never

been recognized before, and the decision creating such liability in this case should be overruled.
c

-

A New Cause of Action for Breach of an Express Workplace Warranty Should not be Created Retroactively.

If this court determines that a new cause of action should
be created for breach of an express workplace warranty, that
new cause of action should be created prospectively only.

In

the analogous context of determining the effect of an overruling decision on persons who entered business or other relationships in actual or implicit reliance or current law at the time
the relationship was created, this court has held as follows:
[W]here persons had entered into contracts and other
business relationships based upon justifiable reliance
on the prior decisions of courts, those persons would
be substantially harmed if retroactive effect were
given to overruling decisions.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
27 Utah 2d 166, 493 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1972).
In the case at bar, the court should not apply retroactively a decision creating a new cause of action for breach
of express warranty in the workplace.

The parties to this

action negotiated an agreement which required in part that
defendant supply plaintiffs with rope and other equipment for

_0 A _

use in flying wire.

Had the parties been aware that their

actions might involve creation of a warranty regarding the
rope, provisions could have been negotiated into the agreement
which would have protected both parties.

If the decision is

applied retroactively, however, defendant suffers a great
injustice by being exposed to a liability in excess of one
million dollars based on a risk which it did not intend or
agree to assume and from which it could have been protected by
negotiation.
POINT II
THE ALLEGED EXPRESS WARRANTY IN THIS CASE IS
UNSUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION AND IS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE.
It is undisputed that no consideration exchanged hands in
the creation of the alleged warranty in this case, because the
alleged warranty was made after the final agreement between
Tri-0 and Rocky Mountain to fly wire had been reached.

Plain-

tiff admitted in open court that there was no consideration and
claimed that his agreement to fly in reliance upon the alleged
warranty was a substitute therefore.

(Tr. 737-38.)

Such reli-

ance was insufficient to act as a substitute for consideration.
A.

If Reliance Is Permitted to Substitute for Consideration in This Case, The Court Will Create a Strict
Liability Remedy for Misrepresentation.

As detailed above, the tort of misrepresentation is made up
of three basic elements:

a misrepresentation, fault and
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reliance.

The cause of action for warranty in this case lacks

the requirements of fault, leaving as its only elements misrepresentation and reliance.
In its prior decision in this case, this court defined the
elements of the express warranty of fitness as follows:
Any direct and positive affirmation of fact, as distinguished from mere opinion or judgment, made by one
party to the contract that induces the other party to
act in reliance thereon constitutes an express
warranty.
667 P.2d at 606.

The court, however, acknowledged the contrac-

tual nature of warranty, id.

at 604, and Justice Howe, concur-

ring, stated that the express warranty would have to be supported by new consideration.

Id. at 607.

Naked reliance cannot be a substitute for consideration in
this case because reliance is also an element of the warranty
itself.

By definition, wherever a warranty exists, reliance

must also exist.

If reliance on the misrepresentation were

sufficient to establish consideration for a warranty, consideration in an express warranty case would be established as a
matter of law in all cases without inquiry.

In order to

recover, the plaintiff would only be required to show that the
statement was made, that it was untrue, and that he relied upon
it.

The district court in the instant case effectively so

found by ruling that reliance was established as a matter of
law:
It was the Court's opinion and still is, that if the
jury found that the alleged warranty had been made,
-26-

that it was as a matter of law the type of statement
upon which the defendant should expect that the plaintiff would rely. (R. 1607.)
Plainly, the result is to make the defendant strictly
liable for all misrepresentations of fact.

The law, except as

created by this case, has never extended so far and should not
do so.

Because plaintiffs can show no other consideration for

the alleged warranty, the case should be reversed and remanded
for entry of judgment in favor of defendant.
B.

Groen's Performance of a Pre-existing Contractual Duty
in Reliance on the Alleged Express Warranty Was Under
General Contract Principles an Inadequate Substitute
for Consideration.

Even if this court holds that reliance on an alleged warranty is sufficient consideration for the warranty, Groen's
reliance on the alleged warranty in this case was in performance of a pre-existing contractual duty and thus cannot
constitute consideration for the later "warranty".

It is a

settled principle of contract law that a contracting party,
once obligated to perform under contract, cannot exact from the
other party a further contractual promise without giving some
further consideration for that promise:
Under no conceivable theory can the doing of an act
which a party is already obligated to do, constitute
the consideration for a new promise on the part of the
other party.
Van Tassel v. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P.2d 350, 355 (1950).
In the case at bar, plaintiffs were already under a contractual
obligation to fly the wire when the statements concerning the
-27-

rope were made.

Thus, any warranties concerning the rope,

being contractual in nature, must be supported by some consideration beyond merely agreeing to fly the wire that day.
The requirement that the alleged assurances as to rope
strength be supported by consideration is derived from contract
law.

In Zimzow Construction Co. v. Giovannoni, 263 Wis. 185,

56 N.W.2d, 782 (1953), for example, plaintiff agreed to perform
construction work in defendant's basement aimed at eliminating
water leaks.

After the initial agreement was entered and work

had commenced, defendant alleged that plaintiff warranted to
him that the basement would not leak, when in fact it did
leak.

The court held that the warranty, even if made, was not

supported by separate consideration and was therefore not
enforceable:
Moreover, the court rightly concluded that even if
such an agreement had been made, it was subsequent to
the original contract, and therefore did not constitute a part thereof. As stated in Williston on
Contracts, Vol. 4, page 2697: "Statements subsequent
to the bargain cannot amount to a warranty unless
there is a new consideration."
56 N.W.2d at 783.

Justice Howe, in his concurring opinion in

the prior appeal of this case, agreed, citing Zimzow:
I concur, but I believe that on the retrial the court
will need to find that any express warranty made by
Tri-0 was supported by legal consideration. I make
this observation because the alleged express warranty
claimed by Groen was made by Tri-0 after the contract
was signed and therefore would have to be supported by
new consideration.
667 P.2d at 607 (Howe, J., concurring).
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Professor Williston also recognizes the principle that
warranties must be supported by new consideration:
Consideration, by its very definition, must be given
in exchange for the promise, or at least in reliance
upon the promise. Accordingly, something which has
been given before the promise was made, and, therefore, without reference to it, cannot, properly speaking, be legal consideration. As a general principle,
this is well recognized and illustrations might easily
be multiplied to show it. Thus, a warranty made after
a sale as been completed, or an agreement to remove
encumbrances which a vendor was not bound to do by his
original contract, is invalid.
Similarly, a guaranty made after the obligation
guaranteed has been entered into is invalid without
new consideration.
Williston on Contracts § 142 at 620-621 (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiffs claim that, by agreeing to fly the wire, Groen
relied on the alleged representations concerning rope strength
and that, under a theory of promissory estoppel, his reliance
constitutes consideration for the alleged warranty.

The flaw

in plaintiffs1 argument lies in its necessary characterization
of Groen's performance of the pre-existing obligation to fly as
in reliance on the alleged warranty.

If such were the case,

the doctrine that performance of a pre-existing obligation
cannot constitute consideration for additional promises would
be rendered meaningless.
An example is illustrative:

Suppose that A contracts with

B to perform services for B in exchange for B's promise to pay
a fixed amount.

At the time scheduled for performance, A

notifies B that he will not perform for the stated price, and
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demands additional compensation, which B agrees to pay.
reliance on B's promise, A performs as agreed.

In

The doctrine of

pre-existing duty precludes A from enforcing the additional
promise of B even though he technically relied on that promise
in agreeing to perform.
The example demonstrates the inconsistency of the doctrine
of reliance with the rules regarding pre-existing duty.

In the

case at bar, Groen's alleged reliance consisted merely in doing
that which he and Rocky Mountain Helicopter had already agreed
to do.

Thus, the theory of reliance is inapposite and a show-

ing of new consideration is required.

Because no such showing

was or could have been made, the case should be reversed and
judgment entered for defendant.
POINT III
THE JURY'S FINDINGS OF CAUSATION AND LACK OF
MISUSE WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT,
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
A jury verdict cannot stand unless there is competent,
admissible evidence to support it.

As this court has noted:

If there is any substantial competent evidence upon
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make
the finding it should stand. But if the finding is so
plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that no
jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial
evidence.
Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah
1982), quoting Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah
61, 239 P.2d 174 (1951).

The district court in the instant
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case erred in refusing to grant defendant's motions for
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict based
on plaintiffs' failure to produce substantial admissible
evidence to support the proposition that the alleged breach of
warranty in this case caused the accident and injuries in
question.
A.

Plaintiffs' Only Evidence Regarding Causation Was the
Opinion of Gary Flandro, Which Was Without Foundation
and Was Thus Inadmissible.

A finding favoring the plaintiffs on causation was warranted only if the plaintiffs proved that their injuries would
not have occurred without the alleged breach of warranty.
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d at 604. At trial, plaintiffs'
theory was that defendant had warranted the rope used to be as
strong as Samson rope and had warranted that it would not
break.

It was undisputed that 3/4 inch Samson rope was

stronger than 1/2 inch polypropylene rope and would not have
broken at Groen's speed of 30 miles per hour.

It was also

undisputed that Samson rope lacks the elasticity of polypropylene rope.

(Tr. 431, 1122.)

Thus, the full load from the

snag would have been applied more immediately against the helicopter frame if Samson rope had been used.

Because polypro-

pylene rope was used, and because such rope has more "stretch"
than Samson, the force from the snag was applied gradually to
the helicopter frame.

Further, if 3/4 inch Samson had been
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used, the full impact of the snag would have been applied to
the frame.

Because the 1/2 inch polypropylene rope broke, the

frame was never subjected to the full force of the helicopter's
momentum applied against the snag.
Defendant introduced evidence through expert testimony and
exhibits of Dr. Orloft that, had 3/4 inch Samson rope been
used, it would not have broken, and at Groen's speed the snag
would have resulted in structural failure of the helicopter
(Tr. 1117), which in turn would have aggravated the seriousness
of the accident by causing the rotor to lose its support and
rotate either into the passenger compartment or the tail section of the helicopter.

(Tr. 1123-24, 1126-28.)

Dr. Orloft

was admitted by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Flandro, to be eminently qualified (Tr. 1171-72) and had personally measured the
air frame, analyzed the air frame members, prepared drawings,
made calculations and double checked all calculations with a
computer program.

Groen acknowledged that he probably would

not have survived if the rope had not broken.

(Tr. 201.)

In

other words, a more serious accident would have happened if the
rope used had been the same as 3/4 inch Samson rope.

Accord-

ingly, the alleged breach of warranty was not material to
plaintiffs' injuries.
The only evidence which plaintiffs introduced in rebuttal
to defendant's evidence was testimony of Gary Flandro that,
based on his examination on the witness stand of photographs of
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the helicopter, without any personal examination or analysis of
the helicopter or any objective testing (Tr. 1166-68), he felt
that a bracket shown in the photograph may have failed before
the failure outlined by Tri-O's expert.

(Tr. 1168-69.)

Tri-0 timely objected to admission of Flandro's opinion.
(Tr. 1165.)

The testimony lacked foundation in that Flandro

had not examined the helicopter or any specifications, drawings
or manufacturing data on the helicopter.

His entire analysis

was based on a photograph shown to him in the court room.

He

admitted:
Q.

Do you need to know the strength or size of a
particular member you are going to say would fail
before you can say [at] what force it would fail?

A.

I need to know what material it's made of to make
that, but I could. I think the size of these
members have already been stated in other testimony and I can then, therefore, in a very similar
way estimate the area of the structure that's
being loaded here and make a pretty good conclusion on what breaking loads would be involved,
yes. (Tr. 1167.)

Although Flandro admitted he needed to know the material and
sizes of the air frame members to conclude which member would
fail, he knew neither.

Contrary to his assumption, the size of

the member had not been stated in other testimony.
Although Dr. Orloft measured the members and based his
opinion on his personal knowledge of the size of the members,
the record is devoid of any statement as to the size of the
subject air frame members.

Because Flandro had no personal
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knowledge of the size of the members and such facts were not in
the record, his opinion was without the factual basis he
admitted was necessary.

With respect to the material of which

the air frame members are constructed, Flandro said he would
assume the strongest material likely to be used.

There was no

evidence, however, that all air frame members were constructed
from the same material or had the same strength.

Again, a

necessary factual or foundational basis for his opinion on a
critical issue was absent.
Flandro further admitted:
Q.

Now, you indicated that the analysis of this
structure that Dr. Orloft made you thought was
rather simplistic, is that right?

A.

It seems to me he's concentrated on just part of
the structure. And my understanding of things of
this sort is that you must do a pretty detailed
analysis to come up with conclusions about which
parts are going to fail when.

Q.

What portions of the air frame do you think he
excluded in his analysis?

A.

As I understand it, he particularly focused in on
the tubing structure which surrounds the motor
and transmission systems.

Q.

It would be fair to say, wouldn't it, that the
analysis you have just made is just more simplistic than the analysis Dr. Orloft made?

A.

I would definitely agree with that, yes.

Q.

You admit that the analysis can be made to determine what member of that helicopter will fail?

A.

Yes, my feeling is that one must look at each
part of the structure very carefully to make any
conclusions about where the failures are going to
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occur and what's going to happen subsequent to
the failure.
Q.

You wouldn't have any question that Dr. Orloft
could do that?

A.

I think Dr. Orloft could do that very well, yes.

Q.

And you haven't seen the work he did on that,
have you?

A.

I have not.

(Tr. 1171-72.)

In spite of Dr. Flandro's admission that to reach a conclusion as to what part of the air frame would fail one "must do a
pretty detailed analysis," "must look at each part of the
structure very carefully" and needs to know the sizes of the
members, his opinion without such foundation was received as
plaintiffs' sole evidence that the accident would not have
occurred if the rope had not broken.
To compound the error, Flandro admitted that even if the
bracket he pointed out in the photograph failed, serious damage
would result to the skids of the helicopter and a severe crash
would result unless the line were released.

He had not

analyzed whether the line would or could be released if the
bracket failed or whether the release, if any, would occur in
time to avoid the damage.

(Tr. 1169, 1170.)

The incontro-

verted evidence was that if 3/4 inch Samson rope were used and
a snag occurred at 30 mph, the helicopter frame would be overstressed in less than 1/2 second.

(Tr. 1118.)

There was no

competent evidence as to how fast the line could have been
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released, if at all, if the frame failed as theorized by
Flandro.

The only competent evidence was that the average

reaction time for a pilot to trigger the release mechanism is
.75 seconds.

(Tr. 1091.)

Accordingly, based on the undisputed

evidence, whether the air frame failed as analyzed by
Dr. Orloft or at the bracket suggested by Dr. Flandro, a
serious crash would have occurred.
Plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the alleged
breach of warranty was the cause of the claimed injuries.
Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91,
98 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Kuster v. Gould National Batteries, Inc.,
71 Wash. 2d 474, 429 P.2d 220, 227 (1967).

See Groen v.

Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d at 604. Other than the opinion of
Dr. Flandro, there was no evidence from which the jury could
conclude that the accident would not have occurred if the rope
had not broken.

The question of whether the accident would

have occurred with rope as strong as 3/4 inch Samson was one
which was not within the experience of laymen and which therefore required expert analysis.

Absent competent, admissible

expert evidence, the jury could only have speculated as to
whether the accident or a worse accident would have occurred if
the rope had not broken.

By failing to produce evidence on

this issue, plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case
against defendant.
favor of Tri-O.

That failure requires entry of judgment in

At minimum, the admission of Dr. Flandro's
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opinion was prejudicial error and requires reversal and remand
of the case for a new trial.
B.

The District Court Erred in Refusing to Find as a
Matter of Law that Groen Misused the Subject Rope.

The maker of an express warranty is under no external legal
duty to make the warranty; rather, the warranty is a bargainedfor contractual provision.

See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.

78, 388 P.2d 399, 401-02 (1964).

The scope of the warrantor's

obligation must be limited to that obligation which he agreed
to assume,, and liability is premised on the theory that the
plaintiff used the product within the scope of uses to which
the warranty applied and was injured when the product failed to
perform as warranted.

Chisholm v. J. R. Simplot Co., 94 Idaho

628, 495 P.2d 1113, 1116 (1972).

Misuse, by definition, is use

not within the scope of the warranty.

Southern Illinois Stone

Co. v. Universal Engineering Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 452 (8th Cir.
1979).
The evidence in this case was overwhelming that Groen's
speed and method of flying were so unusual as to constitute
misuse of the rope as a matter of law.

Don Lederhos, an expert

pilot and the inventor of the "side pull method" flown by
plaintiff in this case, testified that the upper limit of
safety when pulling sock line is 18 to 20 miles per hour, and
that the best practice is to fly 10 to 12 miles per hour,
slowing to 8 miles per hour at the towers, where snags are most
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likely.

Further, the evidence established that the normal

method of stringing sock line is to lay the lead rope on a "fly
arm" connected to the power line and specifically designed for
wire flying operations.

The traveler is suspended from the

steel tower by insulators, and the fly arm extends out approximately 18 inches at a 45 degree angle to facilitate threading
the lead rope into the traveler.

Defendant's employees on the

job with Groen had observed other pilots pull sock line at an
average speed of 10 to 12 miles per hour, and had never seen a
pilot fly sock line as fast as 30 miles per hour.
Groen1s speed at the time of the crash was 30 to 35 miles
per hour.

Groen admitted that he was flying 30 miles per hour

and that he flew as fast as he could go.

He further admitted

that he did not slow down as he approached the tower where the
snag occurred.

Further, the evidence showed that experienced

pilots do not lay the lead rope against the insulators, because
they occasionally miss the insulators and lay the rope across
the tower arms, where snags are most likely.

Mr. Lederhos

testified that an experienced pilot will stop and lift the rope
off the tower arm if it happens to lodge there.

At the time of

the accident, Groen was not using the fly arm to thread the
rope into the traveler, but was intentionally laying the rope
against the row of insulators.

At the tower prior to the snag,

Groen missed the insulators and laid the lead rope on the tower
arm.

Rather than slow down and lift the rope off the tower
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arm, Groen proceeded at 30 to 35 miles per hour and dragged the
rope across the steel tower arm until it fell into the
traveler.

Groen employed the same unorthodox procedure at the

next traveler, but the swivel connecting the lead rope to the
cable snagged on the tower arm and the rope broke.
The undisputed evidence is that no pilot except Groen flew
faster than 20 mph or drug the rope across a tower arm without
slowing down.
other pilot.

Not even Groen testified of such acts by any
Misuse is use of a product in a manner inconsis-

tent with or outside the scope of the warranty.

In this case,

Tri-O's employees could not have foreseen that Groen would
employ such an unorthodox method of flying, and thus, the scope
of the warranty could not reasonably extend to Groen's
methods.

Even if Tri-O's employees warranted that the rope was

adequate for the wire flying operation and would not break, the
warranty cannot be regarded as unlimited.

Rather, it must be

construed in the context in which it was made.

Groen did not

disclose his unorthodox method of flying, and defendant's
employees had no reason to anticipate it.

Under the circum-

stances, the lower court should have ruled as a matter of law
that Groen used the rope outside the scope of the warranty and
that such misuse was the cause of the crash.

Had Groen

employed normal methods, it is undisputed that the rope would
not have broken and the crash would not have occurred.
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POINT IV
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS CASE CREATED
THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT WARRANTIES ARE
ABSOLUTE AND WITHOUT LIMITATION.
Instruction numbers 10 through 13 (R. 1541-44), regarding
limitations on the warranty, had the cumulative effect of conveying to the jury that warranties are absolute and not subject
to limitation, and inadequately informed the jury that, unless
the parties contemplated otherwise, objective standards are to
be applied in determining the scope of the warranty.

Those

instructions are reproduced in the addendum.
In the case at bar, there was no evidence that defendant
made the alleged warranty with knowledge of Groen's methods of
flying, nor was there evidence that any express limitations
were placed on the warranty.

The jury, therefore, was required

to ascertain the scope of the warranty based upon objective
standards of foreseeability, <cf. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205
(1980), and the instructions regarding scope of the warranty
were therefore crucial.
Despite the crucial nature of the instructions on scope of
the warranty, the instructions, taken as a whole, were unduly
slanted in favor of the plaintiffs.

Instruction number 11

informs the jury that the person receiving the warranty has no
duty to ascertain the warranted fact for himself and states
that the only prerequisite to recovery for breach of warranty
is injury caused by the warranted fact being proven untrue.
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Instruction number 12 states that a warranty can exist regardless of whether or not the person making the warranty believed
the warranted fact or had any knowledge of the truth or falsity
of the warranted fact.

Instruction number 13 states that if a

person intends any restrictions to apply to the warranty, he
must explicitly state them.

The only mention in any of those

instructions to any objective standard is contained in the last
half of the last sentence of instruction number 13, where the
jury is told that the recipient of a warranty may assume that
there are no restrictions on the warranty unless he is aware of
restrictions or should reasonably foresee them.

The cumulative

effect of those instructions was to mislead the jury into
believing that a warranty is absolute and unconditional, and to
inadequately instruct the jury as to the necessity of determining the scope of the warranty based upon objective standards.
In the instant case, there was substantial evidence that
Groen's method of flying was not contemplated when the warranty
was given, and indeed was contrary to the normal practices of
pilots flying wire.

(See Point III.B., above).

Thus, the

cumulative effect of instructions 10 through 13 was to prejudice the defendant, and a new trial should be granted.
Additionally, the jury was instructed, over defendant's
objection, that both parties were found not negligent in the
prior trial.

(Instruction No. 17, R. 1547.)

Because of the

frequent references during the course of this trial to the
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prior trial, the instruction to the jury that neither party was
found negligent in the prior proceeding was prejudicial to the
defendant.

It was especially prejudicial given the fact that

it was contained as part of instruction number 17, relating to
misuse, because defendant's major theory of defense was that
Groen misused the rope and because misuse is factually similar
to negligence, particularly to laymen.

The error was com-

pounded by the failure of the court to provide any instruction
as to the meaning of the term "negligence" and by its failure
to explain how negligence relates to the issues submitted in
this trial.

In overall effect, the negligence instruction

eviscerated the instruction that misuse was an issue in this
case separate and apart from the negligence issue resolved in
the prior trial.

Instructing the jury on the outcome of the

first trial could only have caused confusion and speculation,
and thus was prejudicial error.
POINT V
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND FRAUD ON
THE COURT.
One of the grounds specified in Rule 59, U.R.C.P, for
granting a new trial is newly discovered material evidence.
Rule 59(a)(4), U.R.C.P.

This court has held that a new trial

is warranted when the following standard has been met:
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In order for a new trial to be granted on the
basis of newly discovered evidence the moving party
must show: (a) there is material, competent evidence
which is in fact newly discovered; (b) by due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at trial; and (c) the evidence must not be
merely cumulative or incidental but must be of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood
that with it there would have been a different result.
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980) (footnote
omitted).

In this case, that standard has been satisfied.

Defendant discovered during the trial that plaintiff had
co-authored a book with his brother entitled Huey.
Affidavit of David G. Williams).

(Supp. R.,

Defendant introduced the book

at trial (Exh. D-65) and briefly examined plaintiff Groen about
the book at the first opportunity after discovering it, but was
prevented by virtue of plaintiffs' failure to disclose the book
at an earlier date from adequately discovering further significant evidence regarding the book.

At trial, Groen testified

that he had sold approximately 20,000 copies of the book, and
that, at 9-1/2 cents a copy, he had approximately broken even.
On the Monday following the trial, the Salt Lake Tribune
published an article based on an interview with Groen and his
brother which states that the book had sold 170,000 copies, not
the 20,000 which Groen claims it had sold, and that it has been
on several best seller lists.

(R. 1576.) After trial, Groen

denied the newspaper account that 170,000 copies of the book
had been sold but admitted that over 76,000 copies had been
sold prior to trial.

(Supp. R., Invoice.)
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Discovery of the book was material.

First, it demonstrated

that plaintiff Groen was and is in fact capable of earning a
living, whereas his testimony and the testimony of an expert
witness called by Groen at trial was that he was only qualified
to work part time as a self serve service station cashier or
telephone solicitor.

Furthermore, if Groen1s testimony that he

receives 9-1/2 cents per copy can be believed, the 170,000
copies of the book which the article said had been sold prior
to trial result in income to Groen of $16,150.

The damages

awarded by the jury were based on evidence that Groen would
have made approximately $32,000 in 1984 as a pilot.

Combined

with the $10,000 income from his family partnership which Groen
testified he would receive in 1984, the $16,000 received from
the book results in a net loss of income from the level Groen
would have earned as a pilot of only $6,000, rather than the
$22,000 loss represented by Groen at trial.
The equity of granting defendant a new trial based on the
book is further substantiated by plaintiffs' failure to
disclose the book prior to trial, despite defendant's due diligence in seeking such evidence.

The book was published in

February, 1984, yet at his deposition in December of 1983,
Groen testified that he had no independent ventures which might
generate income.

In response to questions by defendant's coun-

sel at Groen's deposition on December 27, 1983, less than two
months prior to publication of the book, Groen repeatedly
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denied existence of any business venture which might be related
to the book:
Q.

Okay, have you been involved in any other business or income-producing venture since trial?

A.

I formed a company myself called Seagull Press,
which is — my father's an artist, and I paid to
have 22 of his paintings printed in the lithographs. (Depo. of David L. Groen, Dec. 27, 1983,
p. 27.)
•

• • •

Q.

Any other business venture since trial?

A.

No, that's it.

Q.

Any other source of income?

A.

Just my wife.

She works.

(Id., p. 28.)

Defendant was entitled to learn about the book prior to
trial and to conduct such discovery as was necessary to determine the actual profitability of the book to Groen.

Because

Groen concealed the book, defendant was precluded from seeking
current sales figure verification from the publisher in time
for use at trial.
Groen also concealed the existence of the book during his
trial testimony until it was marked as an exhibit and presented
to him.

After extensive testimony on direct and cross examina-

tion about his income from work or hobbies, Groen was confronted with the book.

His explanation was:

"Yes, this is a

book my brother and I wrote.

I forgot.

somebody to ask me actually.

I hadn't thought of it in this

last bit of questioning."

(Tr. 613.)
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I've been waiting for

Only seconds earlier,

two questions previous, after all income had been discussed and
no income from the book mentioned, Groen's testimony was:
Q.

Do you have any particular hobbies that are
income-producing for you?

A.

I have none at all.

(Tr. 612-13.)

Groen's concealment of the book was material and was adequate ground for a new trial under the rule provision relating
to newly discovered evidence and as fraud on the court.

See

St. Pierre v. Edmunds, 645 P.2d 615, 618-19 (Utah 1982).
POINT VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE A SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY WHICH WAS
NOT OFFERED UNTIL AFTER BOTH SIDES HAD
RESTED AND WHICH FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
CONCESSIONS THE WITNESS MADE ON CROSSEXAMINATION.
The district court erred in admitting exhibit number P-74,
a summary prepared by plaintiffs' counsel setting forth
selected portions of the testimony of plaintiffs' economist,
Dr. Samuel Stewart, regarding the value of Groen's alleged lost
income.

The exhibit was not produced or offered while Dr.

Stewart was testifying, and therefore could not be contested
during cross-examination.

Further, the exhibit made no mention

of concessions made by Dr. Stewart on cross-examination, and
thus unduly emphasized his direct testimony.
objected to admissions of the exhibit.

Defendant timely

(Tr. 1186.)

Dr. Stewart gave results of his calculations based on
various assumptions, and arrived at estimates of lost income
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ranging from $550,000 to $1,150,000.

(Tr. 637, 638-39.) Dur-

ing cross-examination, he admitted he had not used any discount
factor in arriving at present value under the various scenarios.

(Tr. 644.) He was asked on cross-examination to recom-

pute present value using a discount factor reflecting his judgment of the present spread between the inflation rate and
interest rates.

He did so, and concluded that, applying the

discount, the present value would be approximately one-half the
value he had given during his direct examination.

(Tr. 661.)

The exhibit prepared by plaintiffs' counsel and given to the
jury, however, did not present Dr. Stewart's computations using
a discount factor and therefore unduly emphasized part of his
testimony while totally excluding a very material portion of
his testimony without giving defendant the opportunity to
demonstrate that exclusion to the jury.

The prejudice was

compounded when, during its deliberations, the jury requested
additional copies of the exhibit.

(R. 1573.)

The sole basis upon which exhibit P-74 was or could have
been offered was as a summary of Dr. Stewart's testimony, and
it was so represented to the jury.

A summary of testimony,

however, must be fair, accurate and complete, at least with
respect to the subject or issue summarized, or it will mislead
and will tend to emphasize some testimony to the exclusion of
other testimony, suggesting the summarized testimony should be
given greater weight.

Because the verdict was substantially in
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excess of the concessions made by Dr. Stewart on crossexamination, it was prejudicial error to admit exhibit P-74 in
the manner done by the trial court.
POINT VII
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON CLAIMED SPECIAL DAMAGES
WHEN THE JURY RESOLVED THE CASE ON A GENERAL
VERDICT WHICH DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
SPECIAL AND GENERAL DAMAGES.
In its judgment, and over defendant's objection, the
district court awarded plaintiff Groen prejudgment interest on
"liquidated amounts" (R. 1600), even though the jury made no
finding regarding special damages and even though the propriety
and necessity of the claimed special damages was highly contested.

The action of the district court finds no basis in the

facts as found by the jury and thus is erroneous.
The allowance of prejudgment interest on special damages in
Utah is of statutory origin.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1977)

provides that the plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest
only on special damages:
In all actions brought to recover damages for
personal injuries . . . it shall be lawful for the
plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the
special damages alleged from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action
. . . .

Because the recovery of prejudgment interest is limited to
special damages, a factual finding regarding the amount of the
plaintiff's recovery attributable to special damages is
required before prejudgment interest can be allowed.
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In the case at bar, the jury resolved the case on a general
verdict which merely stated the total amount of damages awarded
to the plaintiffs.

The verdict does not reflect the amount, if

any, attributable to special damages.

The propriety and neces-

sity of Groen's special damages, many of which consisted of
expenses for chiropractic care, which his own expert testified
could be harmful rather than helpful (Tr. 576-78), was hotly
contested.

Thus, the court could not find as a matter of law

that the jury intended to award Groen the entire amount of
claimed special damages.

Nevertheless, the court awarded pre-

judgment interest on such amounts.

In so doing, the court in

effect took the issue of special damages from the jury, presuming from the size of the verdict that the jury would have
awarded the total amount of claimed special damages if the
issue had been submitted.

That action was erroneous.

This court has ruled in analogous cases that the trial
court cannot presume that the jury acted in a certain manner
when the conclusion is not expressly stated in the verdict and
the party who stands to benefit could have requested that the
verdict form be structured in a manner preserving the claimed
right:
If there is doubt whether the general verdict
awarded damages for tort, the consequences of that
doubt must be charged to plaintiff Cook, who had the
burden of requesting special verdicts to separate the
two recoveries for purposes of review.
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Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 n.5 (Utah
1983).

In the instant case, plaintiff Groen was the party

claiming interest on special damages and was therefore the
party with the burden of requesting that the amounts of special
and general damages be separated in the verdict form.

Because

of his failure to request that findings be made supporting his
requested recovery, plaintiff must be charged with responsibility for the failure of the verdict form to support an award of
prejudgment interest on special damages.

The district court's

award of prejudgment interest must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant requests that this case
be reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in its favor.
In the alternative, defendant requests that the case be
reversed and remanded for new trial.

If the case is otherwise

affirmed, defendant requests that the district court's award of
prejudgment interest be reversed.
DATED this

IjJ-

day of July, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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ADDENDUM
1.

Jury Instructions, Nos. 10-13.

2.

Exhibit 74-P, "Present Value of Lost Future Earnings."

3.

Judgment on Verdict.

4. Memorandum Decision.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/Q

A warranty is an assurance by one person to another person
of the existence of a fact as opposed to statements expressing
an opinion or belief.

A warranty does not require any particular

words or phrases in order to be enforceable.

Any direct and posi-

tive affirmation of fact that induces another person to act in
reliance thereon constitutes a warranty.
Mr. Groen under the parties contract had no obligation to
fly on the day of the accident if he reasonably and in good faith
believed that flight under the conditions presented was unsafe.
To establish/^warranty plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that Mr. Groen would not have flownAthe day of the
accident using the rope provided by the defendant without the
alleged warranties made to him by the defendant as to the fitness
of the rope.

v^-

INSTRUCTION NO.

1\

A person receiving a warranty and reasonably relying thereon
is thereafter relieved of any duty to ascertain the warranted
fact for himself.

The law regards a warranty as the equivalent

of a promise by the person making the warranty to answer in
damages for any injury sustained by the recipient of the warranty
that is proximately caused if the warranted fact proves to be
untrue•

INSTRUCTION NO.

&

In determining whether a warranty has been made,
you need not consider whether the person making the warranty
believed the warranted fact to be true or untrue. The
essence of a warranty is the assurance to the recipient and
his reliance thereon, not the mental impressions of the
person making the warranty.

A warranty can exist regardless

of whether or not the person making the warranty believed
the warranted fact or whether such person had any knowledge
of the truth or falsity of the warranted fact.

INSTRUCTION NO .

\ \

If a person making a warranty intends any restrictions
or limitations on the warranty, he has a duty to explicitly
state such restrictions or limitations.

If any restrictions

or limitations are not explicitly stated by the person
making the warranty, then the recipient of the warranty
has the right to assume that there are no restrictions
or limitations unless he is otherwise aware of such
restrictions or limitations or such restrictions or
limitations should be reasonably foreseen by the recipient
of the warranty.

PRESENT VALUE OF LOST FUTURE
EARNINGS
ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
Assumes:
David Groen will work full time in future
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate
David Groen will earn between $4.35-5.00 per hour which
will increase at inflation rate
Present value of the loss:

$650,000

ALTERNATIVE NO. 2
Assumes:
David Groen will work full time in future
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as
last 5 years
David Groen will earn between $3.35-5.00 per hour
which will increase at inflation rate
Present value of the loss:

$1,050,000

ALTERNATIVE NO. 3
Assumes:
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate
Family business will survive and David Groen will
earn $250 per week which will increase at inflation rate
Present value of the loss:

$550,000

ALTERNATIVE NO. 4
Assumes:
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as
last 5 years
Family business will survive and David Groen will earn
$250 per week which will increase at inflation rate
Present value of loss: $950,000

ALTERNATIVE NO. 5
Assumes:
David will work part-time averaging 5 hours per day
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate
David Groen will earn between $3.35-5.00 per hour
which will increase at inflation rate.
Present value of the loss:

$743#750

ALTERNATIVE NO. 6
Assumes:
David will work part-time averaging 5 hours per day
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as
last 5 years
David Groen will earn between $3.35-5.00 per hour
which will increase at inflation rate.
Present value of the loss:

$1,143,750

ALTERNATIVE NO. 7
Assumes:
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at inflation rate
Family business will survive but David Groen1s salary
will be decreased to reflect his inability to work more
than 5 hours a day
Present value of the loss: $681,250
ALTERNATIVE NO. 8
Assumes:
Helicopter pilots pay will increase at same rate as last
5 years
Family business will survive but David Groen9s salary
will be decreased to reflect his inability to work more
than 5 hours a day
Present value of the loss:

$1,081,250
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DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., a
Utah corporation,
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JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Consolidated Civil Nos.
C-78-3006 and C-79-2990

TRI-O, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Judge Judith M. Billings

Defendant.

This action came on regularly for trial commencing
October 30, 1984.

The parties appeared through their attorneys:

Robert M. McDonald of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough representing plaintiff and H. James Clegg and
David G. Williams of Snow, Christensen and Martineau representing
defendant.

A jury of eight persons was regularly impaneled

and sworn to try said action.

Witnesses on the part of

plaintiff and defendant were sworn and examined.

After hearing

evidence, the argument of counsel, and instructions of the
Court, the jury retired to consider their verdict, and
subsequently returned into Court, and being called, answered
to their names, and say they find a verdict for the plaintiff
David L. Groen and against defendant in the sum of $975,000.00
and in favor of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., and against
defendant in the sum of $37,500.00.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the
premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that
said David L. Groen have and recov£r from Tri-O, Inc., the
sum of $975,000.00 with interest^at the rate of 6% per annum
trs

\<yAJSk Sum*

prior to May 14, 1981, and interest^at the rate of 10% per
annum on and after May 14, 1981 to the date of this judgment,
the amount of said judgment to hereafter bear interest at
the rate of 12% per annum together with said plaintiff's costs
and disbursements

incurred in this action.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that
said Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., have and recover from
Tri-O, Inc., the sum of $37,500.00 with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum prior to May 14, 1981, and interest at the
rate of 10% per annum on and after May 14, 1981 to the date
of this judgment, the amount of said judgment to hereafter
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum together with said

plaintiff's costs and disbursements incurred in this action.
Judgment entered this

-day of November, 1984.

^J<^
"Dutizj/
Deputy Cler

VL
d^^jh
v^

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
I, Dixon H. Hindley, Clerk of the Third Judicial
District Court of the State of Utah, in and for the County
of Salt Lake , do hereby certify that the foregoing is
a full, true and correct copy of the judgment entered in
the above-entitled action.
Witness my hand and Seal of the Court, at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 3cfe

day of November,1984.

H. WXON HINDLEY
Clerk

GENERAL VERDICT

/> rlD^ SOC^/g 7? -J?/

We the jury find in favor of the plaintiffs, and award
damages

to plaintiff

Groen

in the sum of $ ^T^^f QOO'

OO,

and damages to Rocky Mountain Helicopter Inc. damages in the
sum of $37,500.00.

DATED: ^OV.

<9j

^

S

^

FOREMAN
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID L. GROEN and ROCKY
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NOS. C-78-3006
C-79-2990

:
:

TRI-O, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

:

Defendant.
The Court heard argument on the defendants Alternative
Motions for a New Trial or a Directed Verdict, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on the 30th day of November, 1984.

The

plaintiffs were represented by Robert M. McDonald, Esq., the
defendant by H. James Clegg, Esq., David G. Williams, Esq.,
and Rodney Parker, Esq.

After hearing the arguments of counsel,

the Court took the matter under advisement in order to review
the record referred to, and the authorities cited.

The Court

is now prepared to rule on the defendant's Motions.
This matter was tried to a jury beginning on October 30,
1984. The trial was a lengthy one, and substantial expert testimony
was involved.

The defendant now claims that errors of law were

made by the Court, and that the weight of the evidence does
not support the verdict of the jury.

GROEN V. TRI-O, INC.
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1. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
A.

STANDARD APPLIED.

The Court has considered the issues raised by defendant's
alternative Motions as to the evidence presented to the jury
following the standard set forth in Wellmen v. Noble, 12 Utah
2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961) as to the granting of a new
trial.

The Court agrees with counsel for the defendant that

it is a substantial and serious responsibility of the trial
court to review jury verdicts, acting as a safety valve to protect
against unsupported and unjust jury verdicts.

The Court has

examined each issue to see if "it seems clear that the jury
has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts,
or misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence."

Id., at 704, in determining

whether a new trial should be granted.

The same evidence has

been considered on defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict
or a JNOV, but the higher applicable standard has been applied.
B.

MISUSE OF THE PRODUCT.

The defendant claims that the jury disregarded substantial
evidence establishing that the defendant had misused the rope
at issue.

The defendant over objection of the plaintiff was

given ample opportunity to develop its theory of the case that
the plaintiff Mr. Groen had flown too fast, and had used an
inappropraite method when stringing the wire on the date of

GROEN V. TRI-O, INC.
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The defendant's evidence in fact focused on this

point throughout the trial.

However, there was substantial

credible evidence to the contrary presented by the plaintiff
and other knowledgeable helicopter pilots.

It was uncontested

that the task of stringing wire by helicopter is an art, and
that each pilot develops his own technique.

Furthermore, it

was clearly established that the plaintiff was expert in this
technique, and had had a successful career stringing wire on
power projects.
The Court clearly instructed the jury that "if they found
that the plaintiff used the rope in a manner or under conditions
which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant"
the plaintiff was barred from recovery.

The defendant contends

that the Court's inclusion of a sentence in Instruction No. 17
that "negligence is not a defense to a breach of warranty where
it simply puts the warranty to the test" led the jury to error.
The Court is not persuaded.

The defendant skillfully and persua-

sively presented the defense of misuse of the product to the
jury, and the Court feels that the jury was not confused or
misled by the statements concerning negligence in Instruction
No. 17.

The Court felt it was necessary to include reference

to the prior finding of no negligence because of repeated reference
to the first trial in this action by both the defendant and
the plaintiff throughout the proceedings.

The Court also finds

GROEN V. TRI-O, INC.
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defendant's argument that subsequent conduct of a party is not
relevant to determine the original scope of a warranty is without
merit.
C.

CAUSATION OF THE ACCIDENT.

The defendant claims that plaintiff did not produce
sufficient competent evidence to rebut the defendant's claim
that the accident would have occurred regardless of whether
the rope in question broke.

The defendant admits that Dr. Gary

Flandro, the plaintiff's expert, disputed the defendant's theory
that if the rope had not broken, the helicopter would have suffered
serious structural damage, in any event. The jury had the testimony
of two competent experts who disagreed as to the causation issue.
The jury chose to rely upon the plaintiff's theory.

The Court

does not find the jury's conclusion to be contrary to the weight
of the evidence.

Furthermore, the Court finds that the jury

instructions, when taken as a whole, reflect the correct statement
of the law of breach of express warranty and misuse of product.
II.

CONSIDERATION

The defendant argues that the facts presented to the jury
and the instructions given by the Court were insufficient to
establish the consideration required to support plaintiff's
claim. The parties agree that the plaintiff's theory of consideration was promissory estoppel. The Court finds that the requirements
of promissory estoppel were established.

The Court did not

GROEN V. TRI-O, INC.
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submit the issue as to whether the warranty in question that
the Msampson rope was as strong as the rope requested and would
adequately do the job1' was of the type of promise that the defendant
should reasonably expect to induce action on the part of the
plaintiff.

It was the Court's opinion and still is, that if

the jury found that the alleged warranty had been made, that
it was as a matter of law the type of statement upon which the
defendant should expect that the plaintiff would rely.
The Court further notes that the parties agreed that the
plaintiff had no obligation to fly the helicopter on the day
in question if he reasonably felt the conditions were unsafe.
Thus, the plaintiff did not have a pre-existing obligation to
fly, and the Court so instructed.

The Court specifically in

Instruction No. 10 told the jury that they must find that "Mr. Groen
would not have flown on the day of the accident using the rope
provided by the defendant without the alleged warranties."
The defendant cites Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat Bros.,
15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1964) for the proposition
that the Court's instructions were not sufficient on the issue
of consideration.

The defendant states that the Court did not

specifically instruct that

(1) the defendants were aware of

all material facts; (2) that in such awareness they made the
promise; (3) they knew that the plaintiff was acting in reliance,
on the promise; and that (4) the plaintiff observing reasonable

i±
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care acted in reliance, producing the injury.
received an instruction phrased as such.

The Court never

More important, the

Court notes that the instructions when read as a whole, specifically
Instructions No. 10, 13 17, and 18 outline each of the elements
cited by the Utah Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the Court finds

that based upon the facts presented at trial, that injustice
could only be avoided by an application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in this case.
III.

NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

The fact that plaintiff Groen co-authored a book with his
brother entitled Huey is not newly discovered evidence.

The

book was introduced at trial, and the plaintiff was questioned
at length by the defendant concerning it and the profits made
from its sale.

Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that

any evidence produced as to actual sales of the book -- the
prejudice complained of —
on the verdict.

would have had any material outcome

Finally, the Court notes that the failure of

the plaintiff to give accurate sales figures was as much the
fault of the defendant for failing to request current sales
figures verification from the publisher.
IV.

EXCESSIVE VERDICT.

The d e f e n d a n t

c l a i m s that the $975,000.00 v e r d i c t awarded

by the jury to the p l a i n t i f f
passion.

The d e f e n d a n t

was e x c e s s i v e ,

and t h e r e s u l t

of

complains that the v e r d i c t was higher

i
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in the first trial.

However, the evidence

was substantially different because of the passage of time,
and the unsuccessful efforts made by the plaintiff to mitigate
his pain and

incapacity.

Furthermore, the Court is persuaded

that two different juries will almost always disagree on the
precise value of damages, and that this disagreement alone is
not sufficient to challenge the verdict of either juries.
The defendant further complains that Exhibit 74-P was submitted
to the jury in error.

This exhibit simply illustrated in graphic

form the lengthy and complex testimony of the plaintiff's damage
expert, Dr. Stewart, and the Court believes that it was helpful
to the jury/^understanding his testimony.
received

numerous

Furthermore, the Court

illustrative exhibits from

the

defendant,

and would have received any exhibit illustrative of the defendant's
theory of damages which was supported by competent

testimony.

The damage figure arrived at by the jury was supported by and
within the damages testified

to by the plaintiff, and by his

damage expert, Dr. Stewart.

The Court does not find that the

award was so excessive as to merit a new trial —

the relief

requested by the defendant.
Based

upon the above, the defendant's Alternative Motions

for a New Trial, a Directed Verdict, or a Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict
plaintiff

are denied.

The Court

instructs counsel for the

to prepare Findings and Conclusions, and an Order

3^03
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in conformance with the Court's Memorandum Decision, and to
submit them to counsel for the defendant, and then to the Court
for signature.
Dated this

3rd

day of December, 1984.

JU fclTH M. B I L L I N G S ^
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
i** t
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